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ABSTRACT
Potential-based reward shaping has previously been proven
to both be equivalent to Q-table initialisation and guaran-
tee policy invariance in single-agent reinforcement learning.
The method has since been used in multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning without consideration of whether the theoret-
ical equivalence and guarantees hold. This paper extends
the existing proofs to similar results in multi-agent systems,
providing the theoretical background to explain the suc-
cess of previous empirical studies. Specifically, it is proven
that the equivalence to Q-table initialisation remains and
the Nash Equilibria of the underlying stochastic game are
not modified. Furthermore, we demonstrate empirically that
potential-based reward shaping effects exploration and, con-
sequentially, can alter the joint policy converged upon.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.6 [Artificial Intelligence]: Learning; I.2.11 [Artificial
Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence—Multia-
gent Systems
General Terms
Theory, Experimentation
Keywords
Reinforcement Learning, Reward Shaping,
Multiagent Learning, Reward structures for learning.
1. INTRODUCTION
Current trends are showing a rise in interest in Multi-
Agent Systems (MAS). With multiple, distributed agents a
larger set of problem domains can be practically modelled
[35]. To control each agent, a reinforcement learning solu-
tion can provide adaptive, autonomous, and self-improving
agents.
However, whilst reinforcement learning can handle prob-
lems with combinatorial state spaces in single-agent problem
domains [21, 26], adding more agents to the same environ-
ment is a significant challenge [5]. Specifically, as the other
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agents execute their own actions they subsequently influ-
ence the state of the world. This makes the environment
appear non-stationary to an individual agent because other
agents may concurrently learn and change their behaviour.
Unknown to the agent, the same local state-action pair will
have a different transition function even though the global
state-joint action pair has not changed.
It has been shown in single-agent reinforcement learning
that the quicker a learning agent can reach convergence in
its policy the more it will benefit from instability in the envi-
ronment, as it is better suited to adapt to changes [30]. But
in MAS the state-action space grows exponentially with the
number of agents, which may considerably slow down con-
vergence reducing agents’ ability to adapt quickly. There-
fore, methods of reducing the time to convergence are of sig-
nificant importance when implementing reinforcement learn-
ing solutions to MAS.
One such method, empirically demonstrated to decrease
the time for each individual learning in a common environ-
ment to converge on a stable policy, is incorporating heuris-
tic knowledge [17, 25]. However, most existing reinforce-
ment learning algorithms were proposed under the assump-
tion that there is no knowledge available about the problem.
This is often not the case; in many practical applications
heuristic knowledge can be easily identified by the designer
of the system [23], or acquired using reasoning or learning
[10].
In single-agent reinforcement learning, potential-based re-
ward shaping has been proven to be a principled and theoret-
ically correct method of incorporating heuristic knowledge
into an agent. Provided domain knowledge dependent on
states alone, receiving an additional potential-based reward
of the correct form does not alter the optimal policy of an
agent [20].
To date, applications of potential-based reward shaping
to MAS [2, 16] have been studied without published consid-
eration of whether the proofs, originally intended for single-
agent problem domains, hold for multi-agent reinforcement
learning.
The bulk of our findings, discussed in Section 4, consider
the theoretical implications for reward shaping of changing
from single-agent problem domains to MAS. This work fo-
cuses on the analysis of two fundamental results in single-
agent, potential-based reward shaping; the equivalence to
Q-table initialisation [33] and the invariance of policies be-
tween shaped and non-shaped agents provided [20].
The first remains constant, potential-based reward shap-
ing is equivalent to Q-table initialisation regardless of the
number of agents learning in the environment. The lat-
ter, however, takes new meanings in a MAS. The goal of
single-agent reinforcement learning is to compute the policy
of maximum reward but with multiple agents, potentially
competing, the goal becomes Nash Equilibrium [19]. There-
fore, the multi-agent equivalent to policy invariance [20],
successfully proven in this paper, is that potential-based re-
ward shaping does not alter the Nash Equilibria of the MAS.
However, potential-based reward shaping can have im-
plications for the joint policy a multi-agent reinforcement
learning solution will converge to. As we will show, the final
joint policy will still be a Nash Equilibrium of the original
system (i.e., before any agents received reward shaping) but
may not be the same as the additional reward alters the in-
dividual agent’s exploration which effects the experiences all
agents will have.
We close, in Section 5 by empirically demonstrating our
findings but first, to begin, the following section will review
existing work and the required background knowledge.
2. EXISTINGWORK
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning is a paradigm which allows agents
to learn by reward and punishment from interactions with
the environment [28]. The numeric feedback received from
the environment is used to improve the agent’s actions. The
majority of work in the area of reinforcement learning ap-
plies a Markov Decision Process (MDP) as a mathematical
model [22].
An MDP is a tuple 〈S,A, T,R〉, where S is the state space,
A is the action space, T (s, a, s′) = Pr(s′|s, a) is the prob-
ability that action a in state s will lead to state s′, and
R(s, a, s′) is the immediate reward r received when action
a taken in state s results in a transition to state s′. The
problem of solving an MDP is to find a policy (i.e., mapping
from states to actions) which maximises the accumulated
reward. When the environment dynamics (transition prob-
abilities and a reward function) are available, this task can
be solved using iterative approaches like policy and value
iteration [3].
MDP’s constitute a modelling framework for reinforce-
ment learning agents whose goal is to learn an optimal policy
when the environment dynamics are not available and, thus,
value iteration cannot be used. However the concept of an
iterative approach in itself is the backbone of the majority of
reinforcement learning algorithms. These algorithms apply
so called temporal-difference updates to propagate informa-
tion about values of states, V (s), or state-action, Q(s, a),
pairs [27]. These updates are based on the difference of
the two temporally different estimates of a particular state
or state-action value. The Q-learning algorithm is such a
method [28]. After each transition, (s, a) → (s′, r), in the
environment, it updates state-action values by the formula:
Q(s, a)← Q(s, a) + α[r + γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)] (1)
where α is the rate of learning and γ is the discount factor.
It modifies the value of taking action a in state s, when
after executing this action the environment returned reward
r, and moved to a new state s′.
2.2 Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Applications of reinforcement learning to MAS typically
take one of two approaches; multiple individual learners
or joint action learners [6]. The former is the deployment
of multiple agents each using a single-agent reinforcement
learning algorithm. The latter is a group of multi-agent spe-
cific algorithms designed to consider the existence of other
agents.
Multiple individual learners assume any other agents to
be a part of the environment and so, as the others simul-
taneously learn, the environment appears to be dynamic as
the probability of transition when taking action a in state
s changes over time. To overcome the appearance of a
dynamic environment, joint action learners were developed
that extend their value function to consider for each state the
value of each possible combination of actions by all agents.
Learning by joint action, however, breaks a common fun-
damental concept of MAS in which each agent is self moti-
vated and so may not consent to the broadcasting of their
action choices. Furthermore, the consideration of the joint
action causes an exponential increase in the number of values
that must be calculated with each additional agent added to
the system. Typically, joint action learning algorithms have
only been demonstrated in trivial problem domains [31, 11,
6] whilst applications in complex systems most often im-
plement multiple individual learners [18, 29, 30]. For these
reasons, this work will focus on multiple individual learners
and not joint action learners. However, these proofs can be
extended to cover joint action learners, those we have specif-
ically considered include MiniMax Q-learning [14], Friend-
or-Foe Q-learning [15] and Nash-Q [11].
Unlike single-agent reinforcement learning where the goal
is to maximise the individual’s reward, when multiple self
motivated agents are deployed not all agents can always
receive their maximum reward. Instead some compromise
must be made, typically the system is designed aiming to
converge to a Nash Equilibrium [24]. Multiple individual
learners will, given sufficient learning time, converge to a
point of equilibrium, however, no guarantees can be made
that this will be the optimum Nash Equilibrium [6].
To model a MAS, the single-agent MDP becomes inade-
quate and instead the more general Stochastic Game (SG)
is required [5]. A SG of n agents is a tuple
〈S,A1, ..., An, T,R1, ..., Rn〉, where S is the state space, Ai
is the action space of agent i, T (s,A, s′) = Pr(s′|s,A) is the
probability that joint action A in state s will lead to state s′,
and Ri(s, a, s
′) is the immediate reward r received by agent
i when action a taken in state s results in a transition to
state s′ [9].
3. REWARD SHAPING
The immediate reward r, which is in the update rule given
by Equation 1, represents the feedback from the environ-
ment. The idea of reward shaping is to provide an additional
reward which will improve the convergence of the learning
agent with regard to the learning speed [20, 23]. This con-
cept can be represented by the following formula for the
Q-learning algorithm:
Q(s, a)← Q(s, a)+α[r+F (s, s′)+γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)]
(2)
where F (s, s′) is the general form of the shaping reward.
Even though reward shaping has been powerful in many
experiments it quickly became apparent that, when used
improperly, it can be also very misleading [23]. To deal
with such problems, potential-based reward shaping was
proposed [20] as the difference of some potential function
Φ defined over a source s and a destination state s′:
F (s, s′) = γΦ(s′)− Φ(s) (3)
where γ must be the same discount factor as used in the
agent’s update rule (see Equation 1).
Ng et al. [20] proved that potential-based reward shaping,
defined according to Equation 3, guarantees learning a pol-
icy which is equivalent to the one learned without reward
shaping in both infinite and finite horizon MDP’s.
Wiewiora [33] later proved that an agent learning with
potential-based reward shaping and no knowledge-based Q-
table initialisation will behave identically to an agent with-
out reward shaping when the latter agent’s value function
is initialised with the same heuristic knowledge represented
by Φ(s). This is an important fact, because when function
approximation is used in big environments, where the struc-
tural properties of the state space are not clear, it is not easy
to initialise the value function. Potential-based reward shap-
ing represents a flexible and theoretically correct method to
incorporate background knowledge regarding states into re-
inforcement learning algorithms.
3.1 Reward Shaping In Multi-Agent Systems
Incorporating heuristic knowledge has been shown to be
beneficial in multi-agent reinforcement learning [2, 16, 17,
25]. However, some of the previous examples did not use
potential-based functions to shape the reward [17, 25] and
could potentially, therefore, suffer from introducing benefi-
cial cyclic policies that cause convergence to an unintended
behaviour as demonstrated previously in a single-agent prob-
lem domain [23].
The remaining applications that were potential-based [2,
16], demonstrated an increased probability of convergence
to a higher value Nash Equilibrium. As it has long been
established that multiple individual learners are not guar-
anteed to converge to the optimal Nash Equilibrium [6], a
number of methods to increase the probability of this occur-
ring have already been devised. Amongst them are COIN
[34] and myopic heuristics [6]. However, these methods re-
quire knowledge of the reward function or the joint action.
Potential-based reward shaping can similarly increase the
probability of convergence to the optimal Nash Equilibrium
provided a good heuristic, but does so without requiring
either of these specific pieces of knowledge which are com-
monly unavailable in MAS applications.
Both applications of potential-based reward shaping were
published with no consideration of whether the proofs of
guaranteed policy invariance hold in multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning or how they effect the joint policy at time of
convergence. Starting in the following section, our contribu-
tion fills this gap in knowledge and provides the theoretical
results to explain these previous empirical studies.
4. THEORY
To discuss the implications of using potential-based re-
ward shaping in MAS we must consider the differences be-
tween single-agent and multi-agent reinforcement learning.
SGs, unlike MDPs, share amongst all agents a common tran-
sition function and common states but neither of these are
effected by shaping the reward function of one or more of
the agents. Although the agents may change their own pol-
icy and alter their exploration path due to the additional
potential-based reward, this does not change the dynamics
(transition function or states) of the environment, nor the
set of actions the agent can take.
In fact the only elements of a SG to change when one or
more agent implements potential-based reward shaping are
the individual reward functions of those agents. If, as we will
later show to be true in Section 4.2, these alterations to the
individual reward functions do not change the best response
policy of a shaped agent given a fixed set of policies followed
by all other agents, the Nash Equilibria of the underlying SG
remain constant regardless of how many agents are using
potential-based reward shaping.
Formally, this argument will be completed by first show-
ing, in the following sub-section, that potential-based re-
ward shaping is equivalent to Q-table initialisation in the
multi-agent case. Both of these findings, as we will discuss
in Section 4.3, has implications for the eventual policy that
will be converged upon.
4.1 Potential-Based Reward Shaping And Q-
Value Initialisation Are Equivalent
The proof of Wiewiora [33] of the equivalence of potential-
based reward shaping and Q-value initialisation was pub-
lished in the context of single agent problem domains but
also holds for problem domains with multiple individual
learners.
From [33] we quote:
Theorem 1 Given the same sequence of expe-
riences during learning, ∆Q(s, a) always equals
∆Q′(s, a).
where Q(s, a) is the modelled value function of an agent
learning with potential-based reward shaping and Q′(s, a)
is the modelled value function of an agent learning with Q-
value initialisation.
The original proof uses a fixed sequence of experiences
for both agents. The theory can be extended to multi-
ple individual learners simply by extending the definition
of the sequence experienced from the 4-tuple 〈s, a, r, s′〉 to
the 2n+ 2-tuple 〈s, a1, a2, ..., an, r1, r2, ..., rn, s′〉. Using the
extended sequence and the inductive proof from [33] the
following proves that Theorem 1 holds also for multi-agent
reinforcement learning.
Proof By Induction
Consider any arbitrary agent i from the set of all agents. As
before, Q(s, a) is the modelled value function when the agent
is learning with potential-based reward shaping and Q′(s, a)
is the modelled value function had the same agent learnt
without reward shaping but with Q-value initialisation. The
former agent will later be referred to as L and the latter as
L′.
Agent L will update its Q-values by the rule:
Qi(s, a) ← Qi(s, a) +
α (ri + F (s, s
′) + γmax
a′
Qi(s
′, a′)−Qi(s, a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
δQi(s,a)
(4)
where F (s, s′) is the potential-based reward shaping func-
tion and δQi(s, a) is the amount (scaled by α) that the Q
value will be updated by. The current Q-values of Agent
L can be represented formally as the initial value plus the
change since:
Qi(s, a) = Q
0
i (s, a) + ∆Qi(s, a) (5)
where Q0i (s, a) is agent i’s initial Q-value of state-action
pair (s, a). Similarly agent L′ updates its Q-values by the
rule:
Q′i(s, a)← Q′i(s, a) + α (ri + γmax
a′
Q′i(s
′, a′)−Q′i(s, a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
δQ′i(s,a)
(6)
And its current Q-values can be represented formally as:
Q′i(s, a) = Q
0
i (s, a) + Φ(s) + ∆Q
′
i(s, a) (7)
where Φ(s) is the potential for state s.
Base Case
Before either agent experiences anything, the Q-tables of L
and L′ are both their respective initial values, and therefore
both ∆Qi and ∆Q
′
i are uniformly zero.
Inductive Case
Assuming ∆Qi = ∆Q
′
i, both L and L
′ will be updated by
the same amount in response to experience
〈s, a1, a2, ..., an, r1, r2, ..., rn, s′〉. First consider the update
performed by L:
δQi(s, a) = ri + F (s, s
′) + γmax
a′
Qi(s
′, a′)−Qi(s, a)
= ri + γΦ(s
′)− Φ(s)
+γmax
a′
(Q0i (s
′, a′) + ∆Qi(s
′, a′))
−Q0i (s, a)−∆Qi(s, a) (8)
Now consider the update performed by L′:
δQ′i(s, a) = ri + γmax
a′
Q′i(s
′, a′)−Q′i(s, a)
= ri + γmax
a′
(Q0i (s
′, a′) + Φ(s′) + ∆Q′(s′a′))
−Q0i (s, a)− Φ(s)−∆Q′(s, a)
= ri + γmax
a′
(Q0i (s
′, a′) + Φ(s′) + ∆Q(s′a′))
−Q0i (s, a)− Φ(s)−∆Q(s, a)
= ri + γΦ(s
′)− Φ(s)
+γmax
a′
(Q0i (s
′, a′) + ∆Qi(s
′, a′))
−Q0i (s, a)−∆Qi(s, a)
= δQi(s, a) (9)
Therefore, the Q-tables of both L and L′ are both updated
by the same value and so ∆Qi and ∆Q
′
i remain equal.
Given that Theorem 1 of [33] holds for the multi-agent
context then so too does Theorem 2, again quoted from [33]:
Theorem 2 If L and L′ have learned on the same
sequence of experiences and use an advantage-
based policy, they will have an identical proba-
bility distribution for their next action.
where an advantage-based policy is one that chooses ac-
tions based not on the absolute magnitude of the Q-values
but on their relative differences within the current state. Ex-
amples of advantage-based policies include greedy, -greedy
and Boltzmann soft-max.
This is immediately apparent when considering both
∆Qi = ∆Q
′
i from Theorem 1 and Equations 5 and 7. As
the difference between the Q-values of agent L and agent
L′ are the potential of the state, the difference is consis-
tent across all actions in any given state. Therefore, the
actions maintain the same relative differences allowing an
advantage-based policy to make the same action decisions.
Effectively, at any time in learning L and L′ will behave
the same way (make the same decisions with the same prob-
abilities). To conclude, whether an agent is shaped or ini-
tialised it will have the same effect on all other agents in
the environment, the learning dynamics are not changed by
using one method or the other and the agents as a collec-
tive whole will converge or not upon the same joint policy
regardless of whether the agent was shaped or initialised.
Finally, although the proof here was written specifically
for Q-learning, this was simply in keeping with the original
work of [33]. In single-agent problem domains the equiv-
alence of Q-table initialisation and potential-based reward
shaping can be proven also in SARSA and other temporal
difference algorithms [33]. Similar extensions to multi-agent,
as above, are possible also for these extensions.
4.2 Potential-Based Reward Shaping Does
Not Alter The Nash Equilibria Of A
Stochastic Game
As already established the common goal of MARL is a
Nash Equilibrium. The typical concern of modifying a re-
ward function is that the original goals of the agent will be
altered. Ng showed previously that in the single-agent con-
text, the optimum policy was unchanged by the introduction
of reward shaping provided the function was potential-based
[20]. To extend this to MARL we must now consider whether
implementing the same reward shaping in one or more agents
in a SG will alter its points of equilibrium.
Formally a Nash Equilibrium in a SG is:
∀i ∈ 1 . . . n, pii ∈ Πi|Ri(piNEi ∪ piNE−i ) ≥ Ri(pii ∪ piNE−i ) (10)
where n is the number of agents, Πi is the set of all possible
policies of agent i, Ri is the reward function for agent i, pi
NE
i
is a specific policy of agent i and piNE−i is the joint policy of
all agents except agent i following their own fixed specific
policy. If the inequality holds for all agents, the joint policy
of each agent following its policy piNEi is a Nash Equilibrium.
Now consider any arbitrary agent i from the set of all
agents. For the inequality above to hold for agent i, we must
consider the set ΠNEi of all joint policies consisting of each
possible policy of agent i combined with piNE−i . Formally,
this set contains:
∀pii ∈ Πi|(pii ∪ piNE−i ) (11)
Each fixed joint policy in the set ΠNEi will generate a fixed
infinite sequence of experiences when followed consistently
from the current state s0 of the form:
s¯ = s0, a0,0, a0,1, . . . , a0,n, r0,0, r0,1, . . . , r0,n, . . . ,
s∞, a∞,0, a∞,1, . . . , a∞,n, r∞,0, r∞,1, . . . , r∞,n, . . .
(12)
where sj is the state at time j, aj,i is the action taken by
agent i at time j and rj,i is the reward received by agent i
at time j.
Then using the proof of [1], we can show the difference
of the return received by agent i when following any arbi-
trary fixed sequence with or without potential-based reward
shaping is the potential of the state s0.
Proof
The return for agent i when experiencing sequence s¯ in a
discounted framework without shaping is:
Ui(s¯) =
∞∑
j=0
γjrj,i (13)
Now consider the same agent but with a reward function
modified by adding a potential-based reward function. The
return of the shaped agent experiencing the same sequence
s¯ is:
Ui,Φ(s¯) =
∞∑
j=0
γj(rj,i + F (sj , sj+1))
=
∞∑
j=0
γj(rj,i + γΦ(sj+1)− Φ(sj))
=
∞∑
j=0
γjrj,i +
∞∑
j=0
γj+1Φ(sj+1)−
∞∑
j=0
γjΦ(sj)
= Ui(s¯) +
∞∑
j=1
γjΦ(sj)− Φ(s0)−
∞∑
j=1
γjΦ(sj)
= Ui(s¯)− Φ(s0) (14)
Therefore, any policy that previously maintained the in-
equality of Equation 10 will still maintain the inequality.
Formally, and more strictly we can conclude:
∀pii ∈ Πi| (Ri(piNEi ∪ piNE−i ) ≥ Ri(pii ∪ piNE−i ))↔
(Ri,Φ(pi
NE
i ∪ piNE−i ) ≥ Ri,Φ(pii ∪ piNE−i )) (15)
where Ri,Φ is the reward function of agent i when receiv-
ing both the environmental reward and the potential-based
reward shaping.
As implementing reward shaping only effects the reward
function of that agent, the remaining agents will also still
maintain the same policies as part of the Nash Equilibria.
Whether the group will converge to this point depends on
the learning algorithm used and is outside of this proof.
However, it suffices to say that regardless of how many
agents in the MAS are or are not implementing potential-
based reward shaping the points of equilibrium will remain
constant.
4.3 Potential-Based Reward Shaping Alters
Exploration
In Section 4.1 we showed that an agent in a MAS receiving
potential-based reward shaping is equivalent to one whose
Q-table was initialised with each state s set to the poten-
tial Φ(s) of that state. However, the implications of this
proof in a MAS extend past showing that two methods of
introducing domain knowledge are equivalent. Instead, it is
worth considering the results of [32], in which Wellman and
Hu showed that the joint policy converged upon in a learn-
ing MAS was highly sensitive to initial belief. This clearly
applies directly to Q-table initialisation, where the initial
values directly represent some initial belief, and therefore,
given that we have shown the equivalence between initial-
isation and shaping, also applies to potential-based reward
shaping. This can be reasoned intuitively by considering the
following.
The MDP of an agent deployed in a common environ-
ment with other learning agents does not hold the Markov
property as the transition probabilities are subject to change
with the unseen but changing policies of the other agents.
Therefore, the convergence to optimal policy guarantees of
Q-learning do not hold. This has been demonstrated empiri-
cally in multi-agent reinforcement applications with multiple
Q-learners converging to sub-optimal joint policies [2].
Shaping alters the path of exploration an agent takes. In
single-agent reinforcement learning, as convergence to the
optimal policy is guaranteed, this only effects the time taken
to reach convergence. If a good heuristic, is used the time
will be reduced as the number of sub-optimal actions taken
will be reduced, but similarly if a bad heuristic is used the
agent will take longer to converge to the optimal policy.
The concept of an optimal policy in MAS is not as clear.
We have identified Nash Equilibrium as the typical goal of
multi-agent reinforcement learning, but this does not nec-
essarily identify a single goal. Most applications, with the
exception of the very trivial, will have multiple points of
equilibrium. Multiple individual learners will converge to
one of these equilibrium, but whether it will be the opti-
mum cannot be guaranteed [6]
With multiple agents in the same environment, altering
the exploration of one will change the experiences of all
agents [12, 13]. The change in actions chosen by even just
one agent now receiving potential-based reward shaping will
result in different state transitions. The agents will then
explore different areas of the joint policy space and, with
multiple points of equilibrium possible, may converge to a
different equilibrium then had the agent not received the
reward shaping and subsequently not have altered its indi-
vidual exploration path.
Therefore, in multi-agent problem domains, without the
guarantee of convergence to a single optimum goal, shaping
can lead to convergence on a different joint policy. This was
empirically demonstrated by Babes and Littman [2], where
a shaped agent was able to lead a non-shaped agent to con-
vergence on a joint policy of higher average reward. When
shaping one or more agents in an environment with multi-
ple learning agents, a good heuristic will encourage higher
global utility similar to how in single-agent problem domains
the use was preferably to reduce the time taken to converge.
Unfortunately, the techniques can also have a detrimental
effect encouraging miscoordination and/or lead the agents
to converge on a less beneficial joint policy by directing the
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Figure 1: Boutilier’s Coordination Game
agents away from frequently, or possibly ever, experiencing
the equilibrium reached by non-shaped agents and instead
trapping them in a sub-optimal point of equilibrium.
To support and illustrate these claims the following sec-
tion will present an empirical study that is typically charac-
teristic of implementing potential-based reward shaping in
a MAS.
5. EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION
To demonstrate the theorised effects of potential-based
reward shaping, an empirical study of a game based on
Boutilier’s coordination game [4] will be presented here.
The game, illustrated in Figure 1, has six stages and two
agents, each capable of two actions (a or b). The first agent’s
first action choice in each episode decides if the agents will
move to a state guaranteed to reward them minimally (s3) or
to a state where they must co-ordinate to receive the highest
reward (s2). However, in state s2 the agents are at risk of
receiving a large negative reward if they do not choose the
same action.
In Figure 1, each transition is labelled with one or more
action pairs such that the pair a, ∗ means this transition
occurs if agent 1 chooses action a and agent 2 chooses ei-
ther action. When multiple action pairs result in the same
transition the pairs are separated by a semicolon(;).
The game has three joint policy Nash Equilibriums; the
joint policy of opting for the safety state s3 or the two joint
policies of moving to state s2 and coordinating on both
choosing a or b. Any joint policy receiving the negative re-
ward is not a Nash Equilibrium, as the first agent can choose
to change its first action choice and so receive a higher re-
ward by instead reaching state s3.
Three sets of agents will be the focus of these experiments.
All agents, in all sets, will learn by Q-learning with an -
greedy policy and discount factor (γ) of 1. One set will
receive no reward shaping, to illustrate the average perfor-
mance without heuristic knowledge, another set will receive
potential-based reward shaping from a good heuristic whilst
the final set receives shaping from a poor heuristic.
The good heuristic, designed to encourage co-operation,
gives states s1, s2 and s4 the potentials 5, 10 and 15 respec-
tively. All other states receive a potential of 0. Therefore,
any transition from states s1 to s2 or s2 to s4 will receive an
additional reward of +5 but transitioning instead from state
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Figure 2: Optimal Nash Equilibrium
s2 to s5 will receive an additional reward of −10. Alterna-
tively, the bad heuristic is designed to encourage miscoordi-
nation and so potentials of 5, 10 and 15 are given instead
to states s1, s2 and s5 respectively. Again all other states
receive a potential of 0.
Our experimental results are intended to show, provided a
good heuristic, the increased probability of converging to the
joint policies of higher global utility (those achieving coordi-
nation in state s2). Alternatively, provided a bad heuristic,
the agents will demonstrate that the Nash Equilibria have
not changed and so converge still to one of the three original
joint policy Nash Equilibria.
5.1 Results
All experiments were run for 100,000 episodes (300,000
action choices) and repeated 100 times. The results, illus-
trated in Figures 2, 3 and 4, plot the mean percentage of the
last 100 episodes performing the optimal, safety and sub-
optimal joint policies respectively. All figures include error
bars illustrating the standard error from the mean. For clar-
ity, graphs are plotted only up to 30,000 episodes as by this
time all experiments had converged to a stable joint policy.
Figure 2 shows that, for this relatively simple game, mul-
tiple individual learners alone can only converge to the op-
timal behaviour 72% of the time. Whereas, provided a good
heuristic, potential-based reward shaping can increase the
probability of convergence to this Nash Equilibrium to 100%.
As theorised, provided a bad heuristic, the effect on the
global utility can be detrimental. The probability of achiev-
ing optimal behaviour, with a potential function encouraging
miscoordination, rapidly drops and converges on 0%.
Instead, as illustrated by Figure 3, the poorly shaped
agents converge to the safety Nash Equilibrium. Despite the
miscoordination state (s5) receiving the largest potential,
the agents do not converge to the sub-optimal behaviour, as
illustrated by Figure 4.
Figure 4, highlights that agents with no shaping or
potential-based reward shaping never converge to consis-
tently perform the sub-optimal joint policy. This is because
miscoordination in this game is not a Nash Equilibrium,
both with and without potential-based reward shaping. Re-
gardless of which joint policy is encouraged, if the additional
reward is potential based, the Nash Equilibria remain con-
stant.
However, Figure 4 illustrates the behaviour of an addi-
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Figure 3: Safety Nash Equilibrium
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Figure 4: Sub-Optimal Behaviour
tional set of agents. These agents receive an additional re-
ward on state transitions that is not potential based. Specif-
ically they are rewarded 5, 10 and 30 upon entering states
s1, s2 and s5 respectively. These agents converge to a joint
policy representative of the sub-optimal behaviour. This
has occurred because if additional rewards are not potential-
based they can change the Nash Equilibria of a SG.
Finally, the learning performance of both sets of shaped
agents favourably supports the use of potential-based reward
shaping in MAS. The poorly shaped agents converge to the
safety Nash Equilibrium after just 10,000 episodes whilst
without shaping it takes agents 29,000 episodes to converge.
More significantly, after only 2000 episodes agents receiv-
ing reward shaping from a good heuristic are more likely
to achieve the optimal Nash Equilibrium than non-shaped
agents ever will.
6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper shows how two fundamental pa-
pers in single-agent reward shaping [20, 33] can be extended
to provide similar guarantees in multi-agent reinforcement
learning.
Specifically, we have proven that a potential-based shaped
agent is still equivalent to an agent with initial Q-values set
to the potential of each state regardless of how many exist
within the same environment.
Furthermore, we have also proven that rewarding any
number of agents within a MAS with additional potential-
based rewards has no subsequent effect on the Nash Equi-
libria of the underlying SG.
Potential-based reward shaping effects the exploration of
the shaped agent. Therefore, it can change the joint policy
converged upon as even just one agent’s modified exploration
can sufficiently redirect the search of joint policy space to
converge to a different point of equilibrium.
Although the agents may now converge to a different joint
policy, the latter of the two proofs guarantees that the new
joint policy was also a goal of the unshaped agents.
Whether the goal achieved is the Nash Equilibrium of
highest global utility, is dependent on the agents’ learning
algorithms. With multiple individual learners, no guaran-
tee of convergence to the highest utility Nash Equilibrium
is provided. However, potential-based reward shaping can,
dependent on the heuristic, either increase or decrease the
probability of converging to equilibria of higher global utility
as demonstrated in our empirical study.
Given a joint action learner guaranteed under fixed condi-
tions to converge, such as NashQ [11], it is possible to con-
struct similar proofs as those shown here. Agents learning
by joint action and receiving potential-based reward shap-
ing benefit from consistent Nash Equilibria, modified explo-
ration to decrease the number of sub-optimal action deci-
sions and guaranteed convergence.
It is also the authors’ expectation that potential-based ad-
vice [8], an extension of potential-based reward shaping to
include heuristics based on actions as well as states, could
similarly be extended to guarantee consistent Nash Equi-
libria when applied to multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Recent empirical work supports these expectations [7].
The work here has been based entirely in fully observable
problem domains, which some may consider uncharacteris-
tic of MAS. However, by shaping agents based on the po-
tential of observations (as opposed to fully observed states)
the same arguments and proofs can be used to show simi-
lar theoretical expectations in partially observable problem
domains. Namely, the Nash Equilibria of a partially observ-
able problem domain would remain the same but the agents
exploration will alter and so convergence may be to a dif-
ferent point of equilibrium or, given an unsuitable heuristic,
may not converge at all.
In closing, adding potential-based reward shaping to mul-
tiple individual learners does not alter the Nash Equilibria
but can, provided suitable heuristics, increase the probabil-
ity of convergence to a higher global utility and decrease the
time to convergence.
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